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RECENT ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS*
MILTON HANDLERt
PROBABLY the most dramatic antitrust development during the past year
was the ruling by the Supreme Court directing District Judge LaBuy to
order E. I. dii Pont de Nemours & Co. totally to divest itself of the 23 per
cent stock interest in General Motors which it had acquired more than forty
years ago.' Perhaps of greater doctrinal import, if not equal notoriety, were
two other decisions by the Court. In Tampa Electric,2 it rejected quantitative
substantiality as the test of illegality of exclusive-dealing arrangements under
section 3 of the Clayton Act in favor of a factual inquiry designed to ascertain
the probable impact of such arrangements on effective competition in the
relevant market; and the Noerr case 3 made it clear that certain kinds of
activity, namely, attempts to petition the government for amendment or en-
forcement of the law, were beyond the ambit of antitrust regulation whatever
their effect on competition.
At the same time, the Federal Trade Commission was prescribing its own
cure for antitrust violations; its Grand Union decision construed the "unfair
methods of competition" language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act as a license to evade the limitations of the more specific pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The year also marked the 25th anniversary of Robinson-Patman. There-
fore, following an analysis of the year's most significant antitrust cases, the
price discrimination law will be evaluated to determine whether it has fur-
thered the objectives of antitrust.
I. THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE DU PONT-GENERAL MOTORS DECREE
Four years ago, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for a majority of four mem-
bers of the Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,4 declared that du Pont's acquisition of 23 per cent of General Motors
common stock from 1917 to 1919 violated the original version of section
7 of the Clayton Act. The Court remanded the case to Judge LaBuy with
directions to formulate a decree granting "the equitable relief necessary and
appropriate in the public interest to eliminate the effects of the acquisition
offensive to the statute."5 In doing so, it stressed that "the district courts, in
*The article is based upon a lecture delivered before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York on June 7, 1961.
fProfessor of Law, Columbia University; Member, New York State Bar.
1. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
2. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
3. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
4. United States v.-E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
5. Id. at 607.
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the framing of equitable decrees, are clothed 'with large discretion to model
their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.' "o
On remand the Government proposed total divestiture of du Pont's General
Motors stock. It suggested that about two-thirds of du Pont's 63 million
General Motors shares be distributed pro rata to du Pont shareholders as
dividends over the course of ten years. The remaining one-third-instead of
going to Christiana Securities Corporation and Delaware Realty and Invest-
ment Company, "holding companies long identified with the dti Pont family
itself" 7-- was to be sold to the public by a court-appointed trustee during the
same ten-year period. The trustee could postpone sales if, in his judgment,
"reasonable market conditions did not prevail," that is, if the price realized
would not reflect "the fair value and true worth of the stock."8 But, in any
event, the stock would have to be sold by the end of the ten years. The Gov-
ernment also sought certain injunctive relief.9
After 28 days of hearings, Judge LaBuy rejected the Government's proposal
for divestiture of legal title to the General Motors stock, but stripped du Pont
of its voting rights and ordered them passed on pro rata to du Pont share-
holders. Moreover, the decree sterilized the votes of Christiana, Delaware,
directors or officers of du Pont, Christiana or Delaware, and members of their
families living in their household.10 In addition, the decree included injunctive
proscriptions. Du Pont was enjoined from acquiring any additional General
Motors stock, exercising any control or influence over General Motors, or
nominating or designating any person for the General Motors Board of Direc-
tors. Du Pont was required to notify the Attorney-General-and secure court
approval if there was an objection-before disposing of more than a specified
number of General Motors shares." The injunction ran against General
6. Id. at 608, quoting International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01
(1947).
7. 366 U.S. at 320.
8. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 7 (N.D. III. 1959),
rev'd, 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
9. 177 F. Supp. at 7. According to the Government's proposed decree, du Pont, Chris-
tiana and Delaware would be prohibited from acquiring stock in or exercising any control
or influence over General Motors; the three companies would be enjoined from having any
director or officer in common with General Motors, and vice versa; du Pont and General
Motors would have to terminate any agreement whereby General Motors was obligated
to buy a specified percentage of its requirements of any du Pont product, either du Pont
or General Motors was obligated to grant the other exclusive patent rights, or General
Motors had to grant to du Pont a first or preferential right to manufacture or sell any
chemical discovery of General Motors; and du Pont and General Motors would be enjoined
from having any joint commercial enterprise.
10. These corporations and individuals were also enjoined from voting General Motors
shares which they already owned.
11. Christiana and Delaware were also prohibited from acquiring General Motors
stock, attempting to influence or control General Motors, or participating in joint ventures
with General Motors. Christiana had to give notice before disposing of more than a
specified number of its General Motors shares.
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Motors as well as du Pont: both parties were enjoined from having common
officers, directors or employees; from continuing any requirements contracts
regarding any product, or any exclusive patent rights or preferential arrange-
ments relating to any chemical discovery; and from participating in joint com-
mercial ventures with each other, or dealing with one another on terms more
favorable than those accorded competitors. 12
The trial court recognized that its task was to devise "a judgment that will
effectively guard against the probability of restraint or monopolization which
the Supreme Court found to exist."' 3 It reasoned that the relief would be
effective because du Pont would be left with "the most sterile kind of an in-
vestment" 14 and the injunction would further insure that the stock could not
be used in any way inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate. Given
the choice between what he conceived to be two effective alternatives-com-
plete divestiture or divestiture of voting rights with the injunctive provisions
-judge LaBuy chose the latter course in order to avoid severe tax conse-
quences for du Pont shareholders 11 and a likely depression in the market
value of du Pont and General Motors stock.
On appeal by the United States, the Supreme Court overturned the de-
cree, 16 with Mr. Justice Brennan writing the opinion for the same majority
of four-Justices Clark and Harlan did not participate-which had originally
held du Pont's stock interest unlawful. Over the dissent of Justices Frank-
furter, Whittaker and Stewart, the majority directed the district court to
order complete divestiture, including legal title, within ten years.
The Government's threshold argument on appeal had been that total divest-
iture in a section 7 case was mandatory as a matter of law.' 7 It had contended
12. These provisions were to remain effective so long as du Pont held General Motors
stock, except that after three years the ban against requirements contracts was to be lifted.
Thereafter, requirements contracts were permitted so long as no contract extended longer
than a single calendar or automobile model year.
13. 177 F. Supp. at 13.
14. Id. at 41. Indeed, the trial court noted, § 7 expressly exempts acquisitions "solely
for investment."
15. At the behest of the antci curiae appointed by the trial court to represent the du
Pont and General Motors shareholders respectively, the court directed that a ruling be
secured from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the income tax conse-
quences of the Government's proposed decree. The Commissioner ruled as follows: annual
dividends payable by du Pont in General Motors shares would be taxable as ordinary
income to the extent of du Pont's current earnings and accumulated earnings and profits;
for individual shareholders, the amount of the dividend would be the fair market value of
the shares at the time of each annual distribution; for taxpaying corporate shareholders,
the amount of the dividend would be the lesser of the fair market value of the shares or
du Pont's tax basis for them, which was about $2.09 per share; corporate shareholders
would be taxed at the regular corporate rate, after allowance of the dividends received
deduction; and the sale of General Motors stock owned by or allocable to Christiana,
Delaware and the Delaware stockholders would be taxable at the capital gains rate.
16. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
17. Id. at 328 n.9; Brief for the United States, p. 34.
1961]
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that section 11 of the Clayton Act required divestiture once a violation was
found by the Federal Trade Commission, and that Congress could not have
intended that relief should differ depending on whether the enforcing agency
is the Commission or the Department of Justice.'8
The Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the Government's underlying
contention, namely, that section 11 automatically requires divestiture where
it is the Commission which finds a section 7 infraction. It held, however, that
courts are not in a strait-jacket when it comes to granting equitable relief and
are as free in section 7 cases as elsewhere to exercise equity's traditionally
"broad remedial powers."19
No one can quarrel with the principle articulated by the majority that "if
the remedy chosen is not effective, it will not be saved because an effective
remedy would entail harsh consequences. '20 Certainly Judge LaBuy did not
proceed on a contrary assumption; nor did Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissent.
The disagreement turned essentially on the efficacy of the decree as a matter
of fact. Although Mr. Justice Brennan acknowledged the "large discretion"
of the district court in fashioning a remedy,21 he maintained that the Supreme
Court has an important reviewing role in assuring that the Government has
not "'won a lawsuit and lost a cause.' "22 Because he deemed the decree in-
effective, he disregarded the impact of total divestiture on du Pont and Gen-
eral Motors shareholders.
Why did the majority conceive of the decree as tantamount to losing a
cause? It pointed to the more than 40 million General Motors shares which
would be voted by du Pont stockholders, and declared: "Common sense tells
us that under this arrangement there can be little assurance of the dissolution
of the intercorporate community of interest which we found to violate the
law. ' 23 Four reasons were given for this conclusion:
1. It would be in the interest of the du Pont shareholders to vote
the General Motors shares to induce General Motors to favor du Pont.
2. General Motors' management, which had become "accustomed to
du Pont's special relationship," would know that the relationship con-
tinued to a substantial degree, and "might well act accordingly." 24
3. Du Pont's competitors might not try so vigorously to break du
18. Now that it is settled that divestiture is not mandatory in a § 7 case brought by
the Department of Justice, the Government's uniform enforcement argument leads in-
exorably to the conclusion that Congress never intended divestiture as a mandatory remedy
in Commission proceedings either. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 417, 449 (1958).
19. 366 U.S. at 328 n.9.
20. Id. at 327.
21. Id. at 322.
22. Id. at 324, quoting International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401
(1947).
23. 366 U.S. at 331.
24. Id. at 332.
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Pont's hold on General Motors' business, as if complete divestiture were
ordered.
4. Du Pont would have the power to sell its General Motors shares,
and this "power to transfer the vote could conceivably be used to induce
General Motors to favor du Pont products.
'25
In short, the fundamental deficiency of the decree, as perceived by the
majority, stemmed from vesting the vote of General Motors stock in du Pont
shareholders. But even the Government's original plan of divestiture con-
templated that two-thirds of the General Motors shares would be distributed
to du Pont shareholders. Nor was there anything novel in this approach.
Where divestiture has been decreed in Sherman Act cases, it has frequently
taken the form of a stock distribution to existing shareholders 26-- cases, iron-
ically enough, which Mr. Justice Brennan cites with hearty approval. 27 Yet
all the consequences which the majority foresees, if the voting rights were
passed through to the du Pont stockholders, apply with equal force if the
stock is distributed to them so long as they remain shareholders of both com-
panies. The transfer of stock ownership obviously carries with it the right to
vote.
Not only is the majority's reasoning inconsistent with the precedents on
which it relies and approves, but it is far from convincing despite its reliance
on "common sense." Wholly apart from its disdain for the elaborate injunc-
tion which was designed to preclude possible anticompetitive effects, (1) the
majority makes the far-fetched assumption that shareholders of public cor-
porations are likely to vote or to make their votes effective on such matters
as the selection of suppliers; (2) it perceives a strange lack of self-interest
in the welfare of General Motors by its own management; (3) it credits du
Pont's competitors with a surprising lack of enterprise; and (4) it conjures
the possibility that du Pont might sell its General Motors stock, with all the
consequent untoward tax and market repercussions to du Pont itself, if Gen-
eral Motors refused to favor du Pont products.
2 8
The majority's underlying premise in finding the trial court's decree in-
25. Ibid.
26. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 355 (1904) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911), decree, 191 Fed. 371 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 188 Fed. 127 (C.C.D. Del. 1911), modified, 273 Fed. 869 (D. Del.
1921).
27. 366 U.S. at 329 n.11.
28. Is it reasonable to assume that any company would incur a tax liability totaling
well over $500 million to safeguard a customer relationship of some $26 million in annual
purchases? See 353 U.S. at 596; 366 U.S. at 350 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). And, of
course, Judge LaBuy's decree expressly prohibited du Pont from exercising any control
or influence over General Motors; from dealing with General Motors on terms more favor-
able than those accorded competitors; and from disposing of more than a specified number
of General Motors shares without first notifying the Attorney General and, if he objected,
securing court approval.
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effective is that "the public interest should not in this case be required to
depend upon the often cumbersome and time-consuming injunctive remedy."' 0
The assumption that the injunctive remedy is ineffective is refuted by seventy
years of judicial experience under the antitrust laws, where the plastic remedy
of injunctive relief has been the principal weapon of enforcment. Mr. Justice
Reed was far closer to the mark when he stated in Timken :3
The paucity of cases dealing with contempt of Sherman Act injunctions
is, I think, an indication of how carefully the decrees are obeyed ...
Once in possession of facts showing violation, the Government would
obtain a quick and summary punishment of the violator.31
In a scholarly dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reviewed in detail the Su-
preme Court's 1957 du Pont decision, including the statement that the district
court was "clothed 'with large discretion to model [its] judgments to fit the
exigencies of the particular case.'" He analyzed the proposals of the parties
and the amici before Judge LaBuy, noted the pertinent tax rulings, and so
painstakingly canvassed the evidence and the issues presented at the hearings
that the reader feels personally acquainted with every important detail. He
summarized the reasoning of the trial court and set out the injunctive pro-
hibitions at length. He surveyed the precedents on the scope of review and
the equitable standards which guided the district court in formulating the
decree. Like the majority, he agreed that the "overriding concern had to be for
the protection of the public interest. '3 2 But he pointed out that the lower court
29. 366 U.S. at 333-34. This is presumably why the majority declared that "it cannot
be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate in cases of stock acquisitions
which violate § 7" and that divestiture "should always be in the forefront of a court's mind
when a violation of § 7 has been found." Id. at 328, 331. Nevertheless, the majority recog-
nized that "courts are not authorized in civil proceedings to punish antitrust violators, and
relief must not be punitive," though it stated that "courts are authorized, indeed required,
to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse effect of such a
decree on private interests." Id. at 326.
The majority repeatedly posited the crucial issue in terms of the "effectiveness" of the
decree to stamp out and prevent recurrence of the violation. Thus, it is all the more sur-
prising that it did not remand the case to the trial court for the fashioning of a decree
after ascertaining the facts relevant to effectiveness; rather it assumed that no injunction
could be effective here.
30. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 604 (1951).
31. It is noteworthy that, before the Supreme Court, du Pont indicated that it was
willing to accept a decree going beyond the pass through provision of the district court
and have its General Motors stock stripped of all voting rights. The proposal was rejected
by Mr. Justice Brennan for these reasons: (1) there would be a "large and permanent
separation of corporate ownership from control," which would run counter to "corporate
democracy" and (2) would make it easier for the "owner of a block of shares far below
an absolute majority" to obtain control-"perhaps creating new antitrust problems . . . in
the future"; further, (3) it would effect a "drastic change" in General Motors' capital
structure, established under state corporation law. 366 U.S. at 333. All three reasons are
quite irrelevant to the effectiveness of total disenfranchisement in eliminating the § 7 vio-
lation.
32. 366 U.S. at 359.
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was well aware of this, and he found no basis for concluding that the decree
would not fulfill this purpose. Hence, "it was proper for the district court to
attend to the likelihood of danger to the public welfare that might arise from
the serious adverse market consequences of divestiture and to the likelihood of
extensive loss to innocent investors through both market decline and tax
levy."
33
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took sharp issue with the majority's assumption
that a carefully wrought injunction would not protect the public interest. He
rejected as an "unsubstantiated assertion" the idea that "any tie between du
Pont and General Motors gravely jeopardizes the play of competitive
forces."'34 He refused, as he tartly put it, "to enter Alice's Wonderland where
proof is unnecessary and the governing rule of law is 'Sentence first, verdict
after.' "3;
It is difficult to believe that the four majority Justices are really prepared
to write off the injunction as a feeble remedy in antitrust generally or merger
litigation specifically. Mr. Justice Frankfurter may have provided a penetrat-
ing insight when he stated: "The essential appeal of the Government's posi-
tion lies in its excitation of fear of any intercorporate relationship between
two such colossi as du Pont and General Motors."36 But he struck at the
jugular when he added: "Insofar as the Court yields to that fear, it is strange,
indeed, that this was not obvious to the Court when it found the illegality for
which it directed the district court to evolve a corrective remedy."
37
"The wise admonition that general principles do not decide concrete
cases," 38 to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter also referred, explains why. the
majority and dissent can be in general agreement on such principles and yet
be at loggerheads on the facts in appraising the effectiveness of this decree.
II. EXCLUSIVE-DEALING ARANGEMENTS AND TAmPA ELECTRIC
In Tampa Electric,3 9 the Supreme Court returned to an interpretation of
section 3 of the Clayton Act which is faithful both to its legislative history
33. Id. at 361. The dissent noted in this connection that the Department of Justice
recognized the relevance of the tax impact in a congressional hearing on a proposed
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code which would alleviate the burden resulting from
decrees of divestiture.
34. Id. at 379 (emphasis by Mr. justice Frankfurter).
35. Ibid. Noting that Judge LaBuy granted the Government the right to appy for
further relief should the decree prove inadequate in the light of changed circumstances,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter commended this as leaving "the door open for 'judgment from
experience,'" as contrasted with the majority's "'judgment from speculation.'" Id. at 378,
quoting Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 386 (1916). He added at another point that "surely
there is merit to the notion of shaping the punishment to fit the crime, even beyond the
precincts of the Mikado's palace." 366 U.S. at 371.
36. Id. at 377.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 357.
39. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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and to the philosophy of antitrust. Twelve years ago, in the Standard Stations
case,40 the Court held that exclusive-dealing arrangements violated section 3
whenever they foreclosed competition from substantial share of the line of
commerce affected, regardless of their real competitive impact in that mar-
ket.41 Though the narrow holding of Tampa Electric turned on the proper
definition of the geographic market,4 what Mr. Justice Clark, writing for a
seven-member majority,43 did to Standard Stations is as neat a piece of judi-
cial surgery as has been seen in some time.44
Tampa Electric, a utility serving metropolitan Tampa, Florida and the sur-
rounding area, was building the Gannon Station, which was to be its third
integrated generating plant, adding two units to the eleven it already operated.
These eleven units consumed oil; the two new Gannon station units were to
use coal.
In 1955, Tampa agreed to purchase all requirements of the two Gannon
units from a Kentucky coal company for 20 years. Deliveries were expected
to begin in 1957, and it was anticipated that the Gannon Station eventually
would consume 2,250,000 tons annually. The total value of the coal to be pur-
chased pursuant to the contract was $128 million.45 There were some 700 coal
companies in the Appalachian area where the Kentucky seller operated. Gan-
non's maximum requirements would be less than 1 per cent of the coal of the
same type marketed in that area. But within peninsular Florida, where total
annual coal consumption excluding the Gannon requirements was only about
700,000 tons in 1958, Gannon would account for a very large proportion of
coal purchases.
Just before the first coal was to be delivered to Gannon Station, the seller
advised Tampa that the contract violated the Clayton and Sherman Acts and
that it would not honor the agreement. Tampa brought suit for a declaratory
judgment. The District Court and a divided Sixth Circuit found that the
contract violated section 3. The Court of Appeals held that the agreement was
exclusive as a practical matter, that the line of commerce was coal (not boiler
fuels generally), and that the geographic market was peninsular Florida.
40. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
41. See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE ch. II (1957).
42. The Court never decided the issue posed by the partial exclusivity of the challenged
contract. 365 U.S. 320, 331 (1960). See Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Develop-
nents, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 371 (1960).
43. Justices Black and Douglas, who dissented, merely expressed their approval of the
lower court decisions, and did not prepare an opinion.
44. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), with Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
45. If four new coal-burning units were added at Gannon Station within ten years,
Tampa had to buy the coal from the Kentucky company for the remainder of the original
20 year contract. Tampa was free to buy coal from other sellers if its eleven existing oil
units were converted to coal; it could secure up to 15% of its coal needs for Gannon Station
from the by-product of a local supplier; and it could install new oil-burning, rather than
coal-burning, units at Gannon Station after the initial two coal units were completed.
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Relying on International Salt 4 and Standard Stations,47 it ruled that the
volume foreclosed by the contract was "not insignificant or insubstantial," 4
and, without further assessment of the facts, branded the contract unlawful.
The Supreme Court assumed for the purpose of the case, without deciding,
that the challenged agreement was an exclusive-dealing arrangement within
the compass of section 3 and that bituminous coal was the pertinent line of
commerce. But peninsular Florida, in its view, was not the relevant geographic
market. The Court did "not believe that the pie will slice so thinly."49 In-
stead, it found the area of effective competition to be the eight-state Ap-
palachian region from which the 700 coal producers could ship their coal to
Florida. And within that market, said the Court, "the proportionate volume
of the total relevant coal product as to which the challenged contract pre-
empted competition, less than 1 per cent is, conservatively speaking, quite in-
substantial."' 0 In other words, on the facts in Tampa Electric, given the
market as defined by the Supreme Court, a finding of legality was inevitable
even under a rigid application of the Standard Stations formula.
But the Court went out of its way to make clear that neither absolute
quantitative substantiality (i.e., the dollar volume foreclosed), nor the com-
parative quantitative substantiality of Standard Stations5 ' (i.e., the market
share foreclosed) was to be the controlling doctrine, stating:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the
probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competi-
tion, taking into account [1] the relative strength of the parties, [2]
the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total
volume of commerce in the relevant market area, [3] and the probable
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition therein. It follows that a mere
showing that the contract itself involves a substantial number of dollars
is ordinarily of little consequence.5
2
46. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
47. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
48. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1960).
49. 365 U.S. at 331.
50. Id. at 333. Assuming maximum pre-emption, the Court said, the figure would be
.77%.
51. The Court in Tampa Electric explained Standard Stations this way:
... the opportunities for other traders to enter into or remain in that market must
be significantly limited as was pointed out in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
supra. There the impact of the requirements contracts was studied in the setting of
the large number of gasoline stations-5,937 or 16% of the retail outlets in the
relevant market-and the large number of contracts, over 8,000, together with the
great volume of products involved. This combination dictated a finding that "Stand-
ard's use of the contracts [created] just such a potential clog on competition as it
was the purpose of § 3 to remove" where, as there, the affected proportion of retail
sales was substantial. Id. at 328-29.
52. Id. at 329 (numbering added). Cf. the "rule of reason' approach in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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In short, substantiality of dollars or percentages is not the end of the inquiry;
there must, in addition, be an evaluation of the probable impact of the ex-
clusive on "effective competition" in the market-which is another way of
saying that the market facts must be probed to see whether sellers have access
to needed outlets and buyers to needed supplies. Lawfulness thus depends on
the probable effect of the challenged agreement on the vigor of competition
in the defined market.
53
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court stated that although $128
million is a "considerable sum" of money, "the dollar-volume, by itself, is not
the test. . . ."54 Distinguishing other cases of section 3 illegality, the Court
noted that "there is here neither a seller with a dominant position in the
market as in Standard Fashion . . . ; nor myriad outlets with substantial
sales volume, coupled with an industry-wide practice of relying upon exclusive
contracts, as in Standard [Stations] . . . ; nor a plainly restrictive tying
arrangement as in International Salt. . ... r5 The Tamnpa contract, on the
other hand, did not "substantially foreclose competition" and possessed legit-
imate economic advantages to the buyer to boot :56
The 20-year period of the contract is singled out as the principal vice,
but at least in the case of public utilities the assurance of a steady and
ample supply of fuel is necessary in the public interest .... This is not
to say that utilities are immunized from Clayton Act proscriptions, but
merely that, in judging the term of a requirements contract in relation
to the substantiality of the foreclosure of competition, particularized
considerations of the parties' operations are not irrelevant."
Standard Stations had rested on an improper reading of the legislative his-
tory of section 3-which the Court itself recognized at the time, but only
partially corrected in an amended opinion.55 This is not the occasion to delve
53. See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE ch. II (1957).
54. 365 U.S. at 334. Though protracted requirements contracts "may well be" suspect,
the Court observed, "they have not been declared illegal per se." Id. at 333. And, though
a single contract may fall within the broad prohibitions of § 3, "it must also suffer the
qualifying disability, tendency to work a substantial-not remote-lessening of competition
in the relevant competitive market." Ibid.
55. Id. at 334.
56. Quoting from Standard Stations, the Court also stated: "In the case of the buyer
it 'may assure supply,' while on the part of the seller it 'may make possible the substantial
reduction of selling expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and . . . offer the
possibility of a predictable market.'" Ibid.
57. Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
58. As first published, the opinion recited: "... it is significant that the qualifying
language was added only after a flat prohibition of tying clauses and requirements con-
tracts had passed both Houses of Congress." 17 U.S.L. WEEK 4516 (U.S. June 13, 1949).
After a petition for rehearing, this sentence was changed to read: ". . . it is significant
that the qualifying language was not added until after the House and Senate bills reached
Conference." 337 U.S. at 312. The Court's original version had been written under the
misapprehension that, prior to Conference, both the House and Senate bills absolutely
prohibited exclusives; the suggestion was that the Conference had inserted the qualifying
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into that legislative history at length. But a capsulized review of the tortuous
course of the measures that eventuated in section 3 should be enlightening. 9
The bill originally considered by the House Judiciary Committee 60 stig-
matized any exclusive-dealing arrangement as an illegal attempt to monop-
olize. Following extensive hearings, 61 the Committee revised the bill to pro-
vide criminal sanctions, violations being punishable by $5,000 fine and im-
prisonment of one year. 2 Unlike sections 2 and 7, which were simultaneously
considered, there was no requirement in section 3 of a showing of intent to
harm a competitor or of adverse competitive or monopolistic effects. The
House approved the bill virtually without change.
63
The Senate, however, took precisely the opposite view. Its Judiciary Com-
mittee struck the criminal penalties. 64 After the Committee rendered its
report, but prior to the Senate debate, the Federal Trade Commission Act
was passed. The Senate Committee then recommended deletion from the
House bill of any reference to exclusives on the theory that this could best
be handled by the Commission. The appropriate paragraph of the bill was
stricken by the Senate. 65 The Senate thereafter reversed itself and restored
the House prohibition against exclusives. 6 Debate continued, and the Senate
once more reversed itself and dropped the section for the second time.67 This
spelled the final rejection by the Senate-so far as exclusives were concerned
clause though both houses had already agreed upon absolute prohibition. In fact, while the
House bill included an absolute prohibition of exclusives, the Senate did not prohibit any
exclusives, restricting itself to patent tie-ins. Thus, the Conference Bill was a compromise
between the conflicting approaches of the House and Senate-a fact which the revised
version of the Standard Stations opinion still sloughs over.
59. Following the skein of § 3's history through the labyrinth of the legislative pro-
ceedings is a far more precarious task than the usual sortie into legislative history, since
the debates, save for the brief discussion of the Conference measure, related to bills which
were totally different from the final enactment.
60. The bill provided:
Sec. 10. That it shall be deemed an attempt to monopolize trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations or a part thereof, for any person
in interstate or foreign commerce to make a sale of goods, wares, or merchandise
or fix a price charged therefor or discount from or rebate upon such price, on the
condition or understanding that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods,
wares, or merchandise of a competitor or competitors of the seller.
61. Hearbigs Before the House Judiciary Committee on Trust Legislation, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914).
62. H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); see H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1914).
63. 51 CONG. REc. 9909-11 (1914). The House approved the Committee Bill by a vote
of 277 to 54, making only one slight modification of the Committee version-inserting the
word "agreement" after the word "condition" in the original phrase "on the condition or
understanding."
64. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1914).
65. 51 CONG. REc. 13849 (1914).
66. Id. at 14272.
67. Id. at 14273.
1961]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
-of the general absolute-prohibition type of bill advocated by the House.
The Senate, as a substitute, passed a section applying only to patent tie-ins,
which were unqualifiedly forbidden. 68
The bill then went to Conference.69 Whereas the House bill had contained
flat prohibitions against exclusives and the Senate bill had relegated exclusives
entirely to the Federal Trade Commission, the final version adopted a middle
ground: the language of the House bill relating to the practices condemned
was retained (without its criminal penalties), but the exclusives covered by
it were declared illegal only where their effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce'-the
highly important qualifying language embodying the yardsticks of illegality.
70
The advocates of absolute-prohibition bills in both Houses greeted the
conference bill with cries of outrage, claiming that the addition of the qualify-
ing language watered down the measure and greatly increased the difficulty
of proving a violation; they urged that inclusion of the word "substantial"
compounded the evils which the qualifying clause would create even without
it.71 Their complaints were unavailing, however, and the bill passed both
houses of Congress without change.
72
These conclusions can be drawn from the complete legislative history of
section 3:
First, Congress as a whole categorically rejected the absolute-prohibition
standard which originated in the House.
Second, the addition of the qualifying language in Conference was not
meant as a mere gloss, without significant substantive effect, on an absolute-
prohibition bill. The contrary intimation in Standard Stations is plainly
erroneous.
Third, while the debates on the qualifying language occurred only after
the Conference Committee rendered its report, the record as a whole indicates
that the new standard, though more stringent than prior Sherman Act re-
quirements, did not outlaw all exclusives-or even those which are quantita-
tively substantial-but rather intended the courts to apply a discriminating
judgment in differentiating between those arrangements which had a reason-
able prospect of lessening competition to a substantial degree and those which
did not. It would be an overstatement to suggest that Congress apprehended
the subtleties involved and expressed any preference between the tests of
absolute or comparative quantitative substantiality and the qualitative appraisal
of the anticompetitive effects of exclusives in their market settings. But it is
clear that the qualifying language was added in the spirit of compromise and
as part of a general revision of sections 2 and 7, as well as section 3. The
68. Id. at 14609-10.
69. See S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
70. 51 CONG. REc. 15637-40 (1914).
71. E.g., 51 CONG. Rac. 15830 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed) ; id. at 16325 (re-
marks of Congressman Nelson).
72. Id. at 16170, 16344.
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absolute prohibition approach was abandoned and an uncalibrated yardstick
of legality adopted whose ultimate meaning of necessity would be determined
by the courts.
The rationale of the Court in Tampa Electric is in absolute harmony with
the legislative record. By the same token, it is in accord with the stand taken
by the Report of the Attorney General's Committee that the proper inquiry
is "whether competitors in fact have ready access to adequate sources of
supply and to a sufficient number of outlets to enable their products to -be
effectively marketed. '"73 There is recognition that exclusives can promote as
well as subvert competition. "Substantiality," to the Supreme Court, is no
longer a matter of dollars or market shares alone, but includes as well "the
probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition therein." Moreover, "particular-
ized considerations of the parties' operations," including the economic raison
d'etre for the contract, may not be dismissed as irrelevant in a section 3 case.
It is ironic that the Federal Trade Commission overturned its seven year
old Maico 74 doctrine on the eve of Tampa Electric. Maico was founded on
the principle that, while the courts might feel ill-suited to appraise economic
data (as suggested by Standard Stations), the Commission had the necessary
expertise and a congressional mandate to make such an appraisal. While the
Commission during the Maico era never upheld an exclusive, 5 at least the
inquiry did not begin and end with the introduction of market share data.
However, in Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,76 decided in September of 1960,
when respondents proffered certain economic data to justify exclusive agree-
ments with distributors of their vitamin-mineral supplement, the Commission
73. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Coamm. ANTITRUST REP. 147 n.73 (1955).
74. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953). See also Kintner, Exclusive Dealing, 3 PRAc.
LAW., Apr. 1957, p. 69; Kintner, The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission--A Two-
Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1143, 1177 (1955).
75. See Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Prods. Corp.,
51 F.T.C. 260 (1954), motion to reopen denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954) ; Beltone Hearing
Aid Co., 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956).
But cf. Insto-Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363, 364 (1954), final order, 54 F.T.C. 741 (1957)
(tie-in). As a matter of fact, until Tampa, the courts also, with one exception, United
States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951), followed Standard Stations
and found a § 3 infraction in every exclusive which came before them. See Anchor
Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217
F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Penn-
sylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d
552 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950) ; United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176
F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ; Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1952 Trade
Cas. ff 67375 (N.D. Ga. 1952) ; cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d
163, 170 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
76. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., TRAD- Rmn. REP. 11 29091, at 37529 (Sept. 28, 1960);
see also Timken Roller Bearing Co., TFa=E Run. REP. ff 29373, at 37699 n.2 (Jan. 24,
1961).
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expressly overruled Maico and rejected the evidence. It remarked that since
the date of that case, the courts had made it clear that economic considera-
tions were irrelevant and that under Standard Stations illegality necessarily
followed from the fact that respondents' volume of business "is substantial
and that their exclusive dealing requirement affects a substantial share of
the market.
'77
Now that Tampa Electric has given the Standard Stations doctrine a face-
lifting, it is plain that the Commission was right the first time and that it
will have no alternative but to revert to its Maico approach.
III. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE NOERR CASE
In its unanimous judgment in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,78 the Supreme Court announced that there are
areas of our economic and political life in which the precepts of antitrust
must yield to other social values. As in Apex Hosiery 70 a generation ago, it
recognized that there are limits to the application of the Sherman Act to
business activities.
The unusual facts of the Noerr case were these: twenty-four Eastern rail-
roads engaged a public relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign designed
principally to foster the adoption and retention of legislation and the enforce-
ment of existing laws restricting the permissible weight-load of motor carriers
and increasing taxes on the trucking industry. The trial court held the rail-
roads' campaign unlawful under the Sherman Act, finding that it was mali-
cious because its only purpose was to injure and destroy the truckers as com-
petitors for the long-distance freight business, and that it was fraudulent be-
cause it utilized the "third-party technique" (pretending in its publicity that
support of legislation favored by the railroads came spontaneously from in-
dependent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was inspired and paid
for by the railroads' public relations counselor).
To Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, the case presented "a new
and unusual application of the Sherman Act" involving "severe restrictions
upon the rights of these railroads and others to seek the passage or defeat of
legislation when deemed desirable."80 The challenged conduct, he believed,
bore "very little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held viola-
tive of the Sherman Act, combinations ordinarily characterized by an express
or implied agreement or understanding that the participants will jointly give
up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away the trade freedom
of others through the use of such devices as price-fixing agreements, boycotts,
77. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., mipra note 76, at 37530.
78. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
79. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In Apex, the Court had rejected
the argument that a sit-down strike was a conspiracy in restraint of trade, thereby refus-
ing to convert the Sherman Act into a policing measure to curb conventional torts and
crimes.
80. 365 U.S. at 135.
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market-division agreements, and other similar arrangements."' It was clear
to the Court that "the Sherman Act does not apply to the ... mere solicita-
tion of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of
laws."
8 2
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts that there were factors
present in the case which made antitrust proscriptions applicable to the rail-
roads' activities. It believed that the anticompetitive purpose of the railroads
-one of the elements relied upon below as a basis of liability-was legally
irrelevant. "The right of the people to inform their representatives in govern-
ment of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws can-
not properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so."s3 While the
lower courts said that the railroads' purpose was to hurt the truckers in every
way possible, whether or not any legislation was secured, there were no
specific findings that the defendants made any direct effort to persuade any
shipper not to deal with the plaintiffs. This proved fatal to the truckers' case
because it meant that any injury they may have suffered was no more than
"an incidental effect" of the railroads' publicity campaign.84 The third-party
technique admittedly fell "far short of the ethical standards generally approved
in this country," but the Sherman Act outlaws "trade restraints, not political
activity" ;85 "deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far
as the Sherman Act is concerned" ;S6 "the proscriptions of the Act, tailored
as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application
in the political arena.
8 7
The Court clearly stated that its purpose in narrowing the scope of the
Sherman Act was to avoid serious constitutional questions. Though the con-
clusion is articulated in these terms, in determining that the Sherman Act
must be thus narrowly construed, the Court balanced the objectives of anti-
trust and the goals of the first amendment,88 according the right of petition a
higher place in the hierarchy of values than the protection of a tradesman
against malicious and fraudulent competition.89 Presumably, a "vicious" cam-
81. Id. at 136.
82. Id. at 138.
83. Id. at 139. See also: "We accept, as the starting point for our consideration of the
case, the same basic construction of the Sherman Act adopted by the courts below-that
no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws." Id. at 135.
84. Id. at 143. The Court acknowledged that there might be a publicity campaign
aimed at influencing government which is a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere
directly with a competitor, but that was not this case.
85. Id. at 140.
86. Id. at 145.
87. Id. at 141.
88. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945) ; cf. American Col-
umn & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. Cf. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909), and kindred cases cited
at HANDLER, CASES oN TRADE REGULATION 786 n.2 (3d ed. 1960) ; 3 RESTATEmENT, TORTs
§ 709 (1938).
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paign to injure competition is beyond the reach of antitrust if it is executed
by constitutionally guaranteed means, provided the Court is convinced on the
facts of the particular case that the uninhibited exercise of the constitutional
freedom is more important to society than the protection of an industry from
such destructive conduct. This admirable technique of balancing conveniences
is the very essence of the rule of reason fashioned by Lord Parker two and a
half centuries ago for the common law 9 0 and by Chief Justice White fifty
years ago for the Sherman Act.91 It is noteworthy to see it employed by the
able jurist who on other occasions has denigrated the rule of reason method-
ology in antitrust adjudication.
9 2
IV. THE FEDERAL TRADE CoImlssioN ACT AND THE GRAND UNION
DOCTRINE
In marked contrast with the Supreme Court's modest interpretation of the
scope of the Sherman Act in Noerr, the Federal Trade Commission in Grand
Union 93 gave an expansive reading to its organic statute. It condemned, as
an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, the action of Grand Union in inducing its suppliers to provide
promotional allowances on the ground that the practice infringed the spirit,
though not the letter, of section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act. As read
by the Commission, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act gave it
the power to "supplement and bolster" the specific statutory prohibitions.9"
Like the courts, the Commission has ample latitude under modern canons
of construction to execute the legislative will.95 Since promotional allowances
are a species of indirect price discrimination, the argument might have been
pressed in Grand Union that section 2(f) fastens liability upon the buyer who
knowingly induces his seller to grant him an allowance denied his com-
petitors.9 6 But the Commission was unwilling to extend the coverage of sec-
90. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
91. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE ch. I
(1957).
92. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
93. Grand Union Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 28980 (1960), appeal docketed, No. 26553,
2d Cir., Oct. 13, 1960.
94. Grand Union Co., TRADE REG. REP. ff 28980, at 37480 (1960).
95. See FRANKFURTER, SOmE REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES (1947).
96. In Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 n.14 (1953), Mr. Justice Frank-
furter left this question open.
Where a monopolistic exaction takes the form of the inducement of a wrongful pro-
motional allowance, the conduct partakes of a Sherman Act infraction and, as pointed out
in the text, is plainly cognizable by the Commission. Cf. Union News Co., TRADE REG. REP.
29335, at 37669-70 (Jan. 10, 1961) :
Union's great size in comparison with its newsstand operator competitors placed it
in a position of near dominance in the field. Profit margins realized from the opera-
tion of newsstands are very small and the total newsstand sales of magazines has
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tion 2(f) by the traditional methods of statutory interpretation. Instead it
chose to predicate its cease and desist order upon the broader base of section
5. The plain implication of the opinion is that the Commission, whenever it
discovers limitations in legislative language which cannot be overcome by the
liberal processes of statutory construction, can utilize the convenient vague-
ness of the concept of "unfair methods of competition" as an independent
source of power to "supply what Congress has studiously omitted ' 97 from
its enactments.""
The scope of this novel theory can best be explored by considering a series
of cognate situations.
Can the Commission in its discretion forbid all price differences by attack-
ing them as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act instead of under section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, which requires proof of specified anticompetitive effects ?99
Price discrimination is illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act only when
it involves products of "like grade and quality." Can the Commission proceed
against a tradesman who practices price discrimination among products that
are not of like grade or quality by charging him with an unfair method of
competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act? 100
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act speaks of discrimination in price
in the sale of commodities. Can discrimination in the sale of services be con-
demned under the Federal Trade Commission Act?101
Can tie-ins, full-line forcing or exclusive arrangements, having none of the
effects forbidden by section 3 of the Clayton Act, be stigmatized as unfair
shown a substantial decline over the past ten years. On these facts it is patently
obvious that to allow respondents to continue receiving large sums not received by
their competitors would inevitably lead to the demise of the competitors and the at-
tainment of a monopoly by respondents.
Even here, the Commission erroneously based its order upon a strained construction of § 5
as a supplement to § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, rather than upon § 5's assimilation
of the Sherman Act. Monopolistic exaction has ahvays been deemed violative of both the
common law and the Sherman Act, and the Commission could readily have rested its de-
cision in Union News, on the facts as stated above, on this solid ground.
97. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959).
98. Cf. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1480 (1956), where the Commission spoke
of reaching "practices not technically within the scope of a specific section of the Clayton
Act"-there, § 7-by means of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. But cf. the
subsequent initial decision, Foremost Dairies, Inc., No. 6495, FTC, pp. 83-84 (Dec. 9,
1960).
Commissioner Tait, dissenting in Grand Union, articulated his objection to the majority
view this way: "I am in vigorous disagreement with an approach to the law which has too
much sail and too little anchor, or too much supplement and too little bolster." TRADE
REG. REP. ff 28980, at 37486 (1960).
99. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). Cf. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 53 F.T.C. 771, 777 (1957).
100. See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
101. See Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935). Cf. Address, William Tincher, Associate Direc-
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methods of competition in proceedings under the Federal Trade Commission
Act?102
Is it to be assumed, under the rationale of Grand Union, that the Com-
mission could have plugged the assets loophole in original section 7 without
any amendatory legislation?1°3
Was the Robinson-Patman Act itself unnecessary since section 2 of the
original Clayton Act dealt generally with the problems of price discrimination
and its frustrating inadequacies could have been transcended by the process
of administrative bolstering and supplementation?'0
°
If, under Grand Union, the answers to these questions are in the affirmative,
then the Commission is clothed with a plenitude of power hitherto unsus-
pected, 10 5 and the specific acts of Congress in the antitrust field which the
Commission administers are essentially superfluous.
tor, FTC Bureau of Litigation, Iowa Milk Dealers & Iowa Ice Cream Mfrs. Associations,
Okoboji, Iowa, Sept. 15, 1960, p. 16:
An actual sale of the seller's products must be involved and, apparently, a genuine
consignment transaction by the seller accompanied by disproportionate equality of
promotional treatment would not violate Sections 2(d) or 2(e), although it might
be construed as grounds for a Section 5 FTC Act violation as an unfair method of
competition.
102. Compare FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), with FTC v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
103. See FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); Arrow-Hart & Hegeman
Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934) ; FTC ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1928) ; id. at 6, 59
(1929) ; id. at 50 (1930) ; id. at 62 (1932) ; id. at 68 (1933) ; id. at 52 (1934) ; id. at 16,
48 (1935) ; id. at 48 (1936) ; id. at 15 (1937) ; id. at 11, 19, 29 (1938) ; id. at 14 (1939) ;
id. at 12 (1940) ; id. at 11, 19 (1941) ; id. at 9 (1942) ; id. at 9 (1943) ; id. at 8 (1944) ;
id. at 8 (1945) ; id. at 12 (1946) ; id. at 12, 15 (1947) ; id. at 11, 16 (1948) ; id. at 3 (1949).
And can the limitations of § 8 of the Clayton Act be overcome by assailing interlocks
under § 5? See FTC, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 13-15 (1951).
104. See FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION 65 (1934):
It may very well be that a violation of section 2 of the Clayton Act is ipso facto
an unfair method of competition and therefore a violation of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. It does not follow, however, that a discrimination in price
which falls short of violating the first may be attacked under the second. If the dis-
crimination is actually within the provisos and exceptions of section 2, those same
defenses would doubtless be interposed to a proceeding under section 5, with perhaps
controlling effect. The wiser course seems to be to treat the price discriminations
in favor of chain stores only as a possible violation of section 2, and not as a pos-
sibly unfair method of competition. The point cannot be overlooked that if price
discrimination was included under the general prohibition of unfair methods of com-
petition when the Federal Trade Commission Act was passed, the later expression
of legislative will in the Clayton Act dealt specifically and in detail with the subject
and would therefore seem to take precedence over the more general statutory pro-
hibition.
Cf. 51 CONG. REc. 16318 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd).
105. Apparently, the Commission's approach to statutory construction is a one-way
street. When it came to deciding whether the meeting-competition defense applied in a
§ 2(d), as well as a § 2(e) proceeding, the Commission had this to say:
"We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted." Since subsection 2(b)
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Whether Congress could constitutionally create an administrative agency
with an express mandate to recast measures passed by both of its houses and
signed by the President is a question of no concern here. 06 It is clear that
Congress exercised no such power in establishing the Federal Trade Com-
mission. The power to administer is not the power to amend or repeal.
Nowhere in the voluminous literature on the history and administration of
the Federal Trade Commission Act nor in the comprehensive jurisprudence
on unfair methods of competition will one find support for the view that the
Commission can avoid limiting statutory language by resort to the broader
contours of section 5.l0T
The Commission derives its authority from several separate and distinct
sources:
1. It is charged with the responsibility of prohibiting unfair methods of
competition, 108 a responsibility which has now been expanded by the Wheeler-
Lea Act 109 to cover unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
2. It is one of the dual agencies enforcing the Sherman Act. This duty
was never expressly conferred. It stems from and is an integral part of the
Commission's assignment to outlaw unfair methods of competition. Any con-
duct rising to the level of a Sherman Act violation is within the Commission's
competence to forbid.
3. In addition, Congress has expressly delegated to the Commission the
administration of various enactments.110 Included in this category are sections
refers only to a seller's furnishing a service or facility and since there is nothing in
the history of the bill or in the language of the statute to support respondent's con-
tentions that this provision may be applied defensively to a charge of violation of
Section 2(d) we must to this extent deny respondent's appeal.
Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. " 29195, at 37589 (Oct. 31, 1960). See
Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1551 (1956) ("... we are forced to the 'bare-
bones' language of the statute... !).
106. Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
107. See cases and materials cited, Handler, Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission over False Advertising, 31 COLum. L. REv. 527 (1931) ; HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE
REGULATION 846 (2d ed. 1951) ; HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 1040-41 (3d ed.
1960).
108. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
109. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
110. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1958); Export
Trade Act (Webb-Pomerene), 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 64, 65 (1958); Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c, 21a (1958); Wheeler-
Lea Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58 (1958) ;
Wool Products Labeling Act, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68a-j (1958) ; McCarran-
Ferguson Ins. Reg. Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013 (1958); Lanham
Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1958); Oleomargarine Act, 64
Stat. 20 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 55 (1958); Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1958) ; Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C.
§ 69a-j (1958) ; Flammable Fabrics Act, 67 Stat. 111 (1953), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1191-1200 (1958) ; Textile Fiber Products Indentification Act, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958), 15
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2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act. Section 11 of that statute"' vests the Com-
mission with "authority to enforce compliance" with these sections in those
areas of the economy that are subject to its jurisdiction.
Doubts concerning the meaning of "unfair methods of competition" have
largely disappeared over the years. Comprehensive as is this phrase, it has
never been regarded as an unlimited grant of jurisdiction. In FTC v. Grat. 112
the first section 5 case to come before the Supreme Court, it was held that
"it is for the courts, not the commission ultimately to determine as matter of
law" what the words "unfair methods of competition" include. There has been
no deviation from this view, although the courts assuredly are more hospitable
to administrative bodies today than they were forty years ago." 3 Originally,
the Court was disposed to confine "unfair methods of competition" to prac-
tices that were unlawful at the time the statute was enacted. This atavistic
view, which would have frozen this branch of the law and denied it all capacity
for growth and development, has happily been discarded."14 The trade prac-
tices which now may be prohibited must either be unfair or restrictive. They
are unfair when they are "opposed to good morals because characterized by
deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression." They are restrictive when they
have a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monop-
oly."1 5 These categories are not "fixed and unyielding." ' 6 As Henderson
pointed out in his authoritative work on the Commission, 117 written within
the first decade of its existence:
... [T]he debates themselves suggest, what seems obvious from the text
of the Act, that it was the Congressional intention to confer on the Com-
mission, subject to court review, the duty of giving a detailed content
to the general principle embodied in the phrase [unfair methods of com-
petition], and to employ, in fulfilling this duty, not only the rules and
precedents established by the courts at common law and under previous
statutes, but the technique of reasoning by analogy and upon principle,
with which jurists are familiar." 8
U.S.C. § 70a-k (1958) ; Packers and Stockyards Act, 72 Stat. 1749 (1958), 7 U.S.C. § 227
(1958).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
112. 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
113. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922); FTC v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1923) ; FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475
(1923) ; FTC. v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924) ; FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) ; FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) ; FTC
v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 437 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953), is not to the contrary; it asserts that the
factual analysis of competitive impact is for the Commission-the issue of law is still for
the courts to determine.
114. E.g., FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
115. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
116. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934).
117. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommissioN 36 (1924).
118. Id. at 36.
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In reasoning by analogy, the Commission can fulfill the Congressional pur-
pose as expressed by Senator Cummins, one of the managers of the Commis-
sion Bill, that "the words 'unfair competition' can grow and broaden and
mold themselves to meet circumstances as they arise just as the words 're-
straint of trade' have grown and been molded in order to meet the necessities
of the American people." 119 Thirty years ago, the author, in writing about the
jurisdiction of the Commission, observed that "Flexible language bespeaks a
desire for flexible interpretation.' 20 But there are metes and bounds even to
flexible interpretation. There is no general authority in the Commission to
formulate codes of permissible business behavior or to introduce into the fabric
of competitive regulation its personal predilections of what is good or bad for
the economy.121 There is no general authority to label conduct as an unfair
method of competition where Congress has spoken on the general subject but
what it has said does not go as far as the Commission would like. For the
Commission to do any of these things is not to reason by analogy or upon
principle, but is to usurp legislative powers.
22
An agency of government charged with preventing unfair methods of com-
petition and restraint of trade has its task cut out for it. There is ample for
it to do in discharging these heavy responsibilities without seeking new worlds
to conquer. The stream can run deep and fast without overflowing its banks.
It will be a long time before business is completely purged of all unfair or
restrictive practices, including the novel restraints which these elastic prin-
ciples necessarily comprehend.
When operating under a specific grant from Congress such as that con-
tained in section 11 of the Clayton Act, the Commission's role is to "enforce
compliance." The Commission's power to enforce is no greater and no less
than that of the courts. It is to be emphasized that this explicit authority is
to compel compliance with the sections as congressionally written, not to
supplement or erase, bolster or emasculate, extend or contract, or otherwise
rewrite. There is no suggestion in either statute that the provisions of the
Clayton Act are to be merged with section 5 and lose their identity as the
careful expression of the legislative will on the legitimacy of the practices to
which they relate. Specific legislative terms such as commodities, price, lease
or sale have finite meanings. Their stretch is quite limited. Once the permis-
sible frontiers of interpretation have been reached, the enforcing authority is
119. 51 CoNG. REc. 14003 (1914).
120. Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission over False Ad-
vertishg, 31 CoLum. L. Rv. 527, 532 (1931).
121. See the ever-expanding list of unfair methods and practices forbidden by the
Commission under § 5. FTC ANNuAL REPORT 85 (1959).
122. See Stone, J., in FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934): "We
do not intimate ... that the Commission may prohibit every unethical competitive practice
regardless of its particular character or consequences"; cf. Cardozo, J., concurring in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) : "This is delegation
running riot. No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer."
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exhausted. No one has expressed this thought better than Judge Moore in
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC:
The expertise possessed by an administrative agency, however, does not
empower it to rewrite the laws which it has been charged with enforcing.
This is the function of Congress.
23
The notion that these concrete enactments can be incorporated by reference
into the accordion-like concept of unfair competition and their narrow word-
ing thereafter ignored is further belied by the legislative history of the Clayton
Act. That statute was passed after the creation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. T2 The Senate, in considering the bill adopted by the House, elim-
inated sections 2 and 3 as unnecessary because it believed that the Federal
Trade Commission Act itself imposed the duty upon the new agency to prohibit
price discrimination, exclusive dealing, and tying arrangements.125 But these
sections were subsequently reinstated upon the insistence of the House Con-
ference managers that the Commission, without specific authorization, would
be lacking the power to attack these practices. 26 It is thus clear that Congress
123. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Black,
J., in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 48 (1948) : "Since Congress has not seen fit
to give carload discounts any favored classification we cannot do so"; McReynolds, J., in
FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923) ;
The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no general authority
to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods
or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage
called competition.
L. Hand, J., in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1929) :
Judges have only a limited power to amend the law; when the subject has been
confided to a Legislature, they must stand aside, even though there be an hiatus in
completed justice. An omission in such cases must be taken to have been as deliberate
as though it were express, certainly after long-standing action on the subject matter.
124. The Federal Trade Commission Act was approved on September 26, 1914. The
Clayton Act was finally passed by Congress on October 8, 1914.
125. 51 CONG. REc. 13849 (1914).
126. 51 CONG. REc. 16318 (1914). Congressman Floyd, speaking for the managers,
reported:
Your conferees believed that in dealing with these contractual relations, the Supreme
Court having held that Congress has the power to declare null and void any con-
tract that substantially interfered with interstate commerce, but that the courts have
no such power in the absence of an act of Congress condemning them, such contracts
would be upheld in the future, not only by the commission but by the courts until the
legislative power of this Government declared them to be unlawful. We insisted that
those three [sic, two?] provisions be placed back in the bill, and finally they were
placed back in the bill without the penalties.
As a matter of fact, President Wilson had called upon Congress to enact an explicit
legislative definition of anticompetitive practices:
Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual processes and methods of monopoly
and of the many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition possible, at any rate up
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intended the conduct prohibited by sections 2 and 3 to be governed by these
sections of the Clayton Act alone and not by section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act..2 7 Perhaps Congress could have delegated to the Commis-
sion the task of defining the boundaries of illegality of price discrimination
and exclusive dealing as species of unfair competitive methods; but it chose
not to do so. It preferred, instead, to designate the Commission as an enforc-
ing agency to outlaw specifically defined offenses. It was unwilling to leave
the matter at large. Instead, it formulated the country's policies on these
issues after full consideration and extensive debate. Far from endowing the
Commission with power to "supplement and bolster," Congress expressly
limited the Commission to the role of enforcing compliance with the sections
as it drafted them.
Can the "incipiency doctrine" be employed as a tool to "supplement and
bolster" the Clayton Act? To answer this question the meaning of the doc-
trine must first be explored. The word "incipiency" appears only once in the
Committee Reports on the 1914 legislation. The Senate Report on the Clay-
ton bill states:
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and mo-
nopolies, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices
which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not covered by the Act
of July 2, 1890 [the Sherman Act], or other existing antitrust acts, and
thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts,
conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consumma-
tion. 2
8
The Clayton Act was adopted in order to prevent conduct which was
thought not to be reached by the prior law and which, if unchecked, might
flower into full-grown antitrust derelictions. Incipiency, thus, relates to the
very acts made unlawful by these four sections of the Clayton Act. Similarly
with the Federal Trade Commission Act. Its basic purpose was to strike at
those unfair acts which had not theretofore been covered by federal law and
which, if not prevented, might generate monopolistic tendencies. There is no
such thing as an incipient violation of the Clayton or the Trade Commission
Acts. The statutes are either violated or they are not. There is no incipient
unfair method of competition; no incipient price discrimination; no incipient
exclusive dealing arrangement; no incipient merger. Only those acts are for-
to the limit of what experience has disclosed. These practices, being now abundantly
disclosed, can be explicitly and item by item forbidden by statute in such terms as
will practically eliminate uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty being made equally
plain.
51 CONG. REc. 1963 (1914).
127. Sections 7 and 8 are likewise to be enforced as written. If the Commission wants
to attack mergers as Sherman Act violations, it may do so. But then it must apply Sherman
Law criteria.
128. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), quoted in United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
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bidden which fall within the four corners of the statutes passed by Congress.
The basis of liability under the Clayton Act is a reasonable probability of
anticompetitive harm. This standard would be meaningless if an incipient in-
jury to competition constituted a statutory infraction. Incipiency in such a
context would mean a mere possibility-not even a reasonable one-of anti-
competitive harm. Reliance upon incipiency would be tantamount to erasing
the qualifying language from the various Clayton Act sections.
Congress vested the Commission with a broad and flexible mandate. But
it did not endow it with the power to legislate. In the final analysis a democ-
racy cannot permit its laws to be rewritten by the administrative agencies or
the executive. Where administration discloses defects or limitations in the laws
drafted by Congress with which the techniques of interpretation are unable to
cope, the remedy is to request supplemental legislation from the elected rep-
resentatives of the people who, under our system of government, are the final
arbiters of national policy. This has been the settled practice in the antitrust
field where numerous legislative changes have been made over the years. 2
This, it is submitted, is the position the Commission should have taken in
Grand Union.
V. TnE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
An important personage in American life recently asked a group of anti-
trust specialists whether it was correct to say that the Robinson-Patman Act
was a "mess." The Supreme Court, though not using such inelegant language,
provided a partial answer to this provocative question several years ago when
it observed, "precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of
the Robinson-Patman Act.' 30 But the difficulty cuts more deeply than mere
infelicity of statutory draftsmanship. Loose and sweeping application of the
Act to conduct having no real anticompetitive significance not only does not
promote but actually restrains competition. This is being increasingly appre-
hended by the courts. In Standard Oil of Indiana,'3 ' the Supreme Court
warned that "Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act . . . to
abolish competition." In Automatic Canteen,3 2 the Court emphasized that
Robinson-Patman had to be reconciled with "the broader antitrust policies
that have been laid down by Congress." In Atalanta, the Second Circuit noted
that the Commission's "rigid application of section 2(d) would stifle rather
than encourage competition .... "-3
129. See ANTITRUST LAWS WITH AMENDMENTS 1890-1959 (1959).
130. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953). Congressman Celler
had branded the Act a "hodgepodge," adding that it "contains many inconsistencies, and
the courts will have the devil's own job to unravel the tangle .... You have the herculean
task to make it yield sense." 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
131. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. ,231, 249 (1951).
132. 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
133. 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas.
fr 70083, at 78341 (5th Cir. 1961).
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The problem which needs to be faced is not whether the Robinson-Patman
Act can be harmonized with the Sherman Act as a matter of theory. 3 4 An
effective price discrimination law is an integral part of a co-ordinated anti-
trust program. Rather, the problem is the more practical one of determining
whether recent efforts to extend the reach of the statute and to emasculate
the defenses which it expressly sanctions should be tolerated in the public
interest.
Robinson-Patman does not in terms forbid all price differences. 13 What
are interdicted are those differentials in price which are apt to have monopoly
repercussions, sap the competitive order of its vitality, or prevent, destroy,
or injure competition. The statute is very explicit on this point. Yet there
is a discernible proclivity in the administration of this legislation to equate
price differences with unlawful price discrimination. 3 6 This occurs in several
ways.
There has been a tendency to infer injury to competition automatically
from the fact that there are price differences in sales to competing buyers.' 37
Because a buyer pays more than his competitor does not necessarily mean
that his ability to compete is likely to be impaired. An inference of competitive
134. Cf. Loevinger, Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECToIN REP. 102 (1961).
135. See Gwynne, Comm'r, in General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954): "It
has often been pointed out that differences in price without competitive injury are not
illegal"; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Fred Bronner Corp.,
TRADE REG. RE'. ff 29125 (Sept. 29, 1960) ; Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100 (1954) ; Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580 (1956) ; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC,
191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951), petition for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). Cf. H.R.
REP. No. 1422, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1949) :
The seller who did not get the order may feel injured, but that does not mean that
competition has been injured. In any competitive economy we cannot avoid injury
to some of the competitors. The law does not, and under the free enterprise system
it cannot, guarantee businessmen against loss. That businessmen lose money or even
go bankrupt does not necessarily mean that competition has been injured. "Competi-
tion," Air. Justice Holmes observed, "is worth what it cost." We must always
distinguish between injury to competition and injury to a competitor. To promote and
protect competition is the primary function of the antitrust laws. However, we cannot
guarantee competitors against all injury. This can only be accomplished by prohibit-
ing competition. We can and do, however, prohibit injury to competition. Competition
is injured through the seller acquiring monopolistic control of a market, by local price
cutting, selling below cost, and in the use of other predatory practices. These practices
are prohibited by the antitrust laws.
136. ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST RE'. 160 (1955). However, Chief Justice
Warren in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 553 (1960), made clear that "price
differences constitute but one element of a § 2(a) violation" and that respondent had
"vigorously contested this very case on the entirely separate [ground] of insufficient injury
to competition.. . ." And see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
137. See, e.g., Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) ; Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, No. 7225, FTC, p. 18 (Aug. 4,
1961) (initial decision).
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injury may be permissible, depending upon the circumstances, but it is not
inexorable or conclusive. A tendency lightly to assume the existence of com-
petition not solidly proven aggravates the likelihood that the requirement of
competitive injury will be watered down to the point of disappearance and
that price differences by themselves will be held unlawful.
138
Moreover, though the Clayton Act admittedly deals with prospective rather
than actual harm, if all that need be shown to make out a case of violation is
that there is a reasonable possibility of injury to competition, as distinguished
from a reasonable probability, the result comes dangerously near total con-
demnation of all price differentials '3 9-unless the difference between "possi-
bility" and "probability" is semantic only.
The same result may be produced by placing the burden upon the respond-
ent to negate a presumption that the price differences are likely to injure
competition.
140
On every one of these matters the rulings are in conflict.
14 1
Those who would attach liability to price differences alone, either as a
deliberate choice of policy or by the erosion of the qualifying standards of
section 2(a), might ask themselves what social end is furthered by encourag-
ing rigidity and uniformity of prices and depriving the economy of the ad-
vantages of the sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller-the traditional
first step by which prices are normally reduced.142 Will it be seriously con-
138. In a secondary line case, there must be proof of the substantiality of the competi-
tion between favored and disfavored buyers, Chicago Sugar Ref. Co. v. American Ref. Co.,
176 F.2d 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950) ; Sano Petroleum Corp.
v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Alexander v. Texas Co.,
165 F. Supp. 53, 57 (W.D. La. 1958) ; id., 149 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. La. 1957), and of
the substantiality of the price differential. Fred Bonner Corp., TRADE REG. REP. f1 29125
(Sept. 29, 1960) ; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
139. Compare FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 (1948), with FTC, Memoran-
dum of General Counsel on Proof of Injury to Competition in Primary and Secondary
Lines 7-8 (1952).
140. Compare Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), modified on other grounds, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946) ; FTC
v. Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951) ; and Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas
Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) ; with General
Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 889 (1954) ; Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 976 (1959), rcev'd
on other grounds, 1961 Trade Cas. f1 70083 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956) ; Atlas Bldg.
Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
141. See notes 137-40 supra.
142. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74
(1953), who points to "that sturdy bargaining between buyer and seller for which scope was
was presumably left in the areas of our economy not otherwise regulated," and who makes
clear the duty "to reconcile such interpretation [of the Robinson-Patman Act], except where




tended, that the administrative and judicial processes are incapable of dis-
tinguishing between the price differences which increase the vigor of com-
petition and those which are reasonably likely to produce the adverse effects
condemned by the statute?143 If the objective is the elimination of monopo-
listic discrimination, as the proponents of the statute assert, 44 the record of
enforcement shows a misdirection of effort, since most Commission proceed-
ings are brought against small business men,145 including those intended to be
benefited by the statute.146 Orders forbidding monopolistic discrimination are
such rarities as to be collectors' items.
Why is it that enforcement agencies do not concentrate on the hard-core
violations and thus protect the public (and that includes sellers, buyers, and
consumers) from the evil effects of the practices which Congress expressly
prohibited? Why instead do they employ dragnet methods to implicate con-
duct having no real anticompetitive consequences ?147 Certainly no one will
assert that the indefensible types of price discrimination have so completely
disappeared from the economic scene that they no longer require the atten-
tion of prosecuting agencies. Instead of drifting into a regime in which a mere
difference in price is equated with an unlawful discrimination, should not the
Government, business, and the bar pause to consider whether this trend is in
the public interest?148
The Robinson-Patman prohibitions become operative only if there is dis-
crimination "between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality." There is little case law on the precise content of likeness in grade
and quality. One thing, however, is clear: there is no authority to require
uniform methods of pricing for disparate products. Thus, a multi-line seller
143. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,343 U.S. 470, 492
(1952), condemning "an undiscriminating prohibition of discrimination."
144. E.g., 106 CONG. REc. 2083-84 (1960) (remarks of Congressman Patman).
145. See Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplishment under the Robinson -Patman Act,
1936-1960: A Statement of the Issues, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION REP. 298, 303 (1960).
146. E.g., Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581 (1951), and the host of Autono-
tive Parts cases: Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) ; E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958) ; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) ; C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1957), modified on other grounds, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); P. & D. Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 245
F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957) ; P. Sorensen Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
246 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959).
147. Cf. Select Committee on Small Business, Price Discrimination, The Robinson-
Patman Act, and the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
H.R. REP. No. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; Kintner, The Role of Robinson-Patinan
in the Antitrust Scheme of Things-The Perspective of Enforcement Officials, 17 A.B.A.
ANTITRusr SECTOrN REP. 315, 321 (1960).
148. See Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplishment under the Robinson-Patman Act,
1936-1960: A Statement of the Issues, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION REP. 298, 308-09
nnA0-42 (1960), which collects the literature assessing the Act.
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need not set prices to realize the same profit margin on all his goods. In
pricing he necessarily must heed not only his costs, but the conditions of
supply and demand in the market. Yet, the Commission's staff has tried to
apply the statute when a seller has charged different prices or realizes dif-
ferent rates of profit, even though the subjects of sale were not of like grade
and quality.
This effort was sharply rebuked by the Second Circuit in Atalanta,149 in
which the Commission contended that all cuts of pork must be marketed
under the same promotional allowance programs. 150 The products were pork
shoulder picnics, canned hams, loin roll, cottage butts, chopped ham, pre-
cooked Canadian bacon, and raw, smoked, and sliced Canadian bacon. Under
the Commission's view, when a seller gives a promotional allowance on one
meat item, such as canned hams, he must give proportionally equal allow-
ances on all meat products which he sells. As the hearing examiner put it:
"'All of these products were pork, and to [me] ham is ham.' "Il In short, by
treating unlikes as likes and ignoring differences in quality among the various
cuts, the Commission would erase the requirement of "like grade and quality"
from the statute and compel sellers to adopt uniform pricing and promotional
methods for every product in their line. This tendency of reducing the Rob-
inson-Patman Act to a set of per se proscriptions, sweeping to one side the
elements which the statute requires the Commission to prove, may facilitate
the task of enforcement, but only at the price of stifling competition. To the
Court of Appeals, it was plain that Congress never intended so to shackle
the economy.
In Standard Oil of Indiana,' Mr. Justice Burton stressed that "Congress
did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or so
radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of self-
defense against a price raid by a competitor." One would have thought that
in light of this pronouncement, the Commission would have accorded the
meeting-competition defense the preferred position it should enjoy in a com-
petitive society. Instead, the Commission continues to begrudge its existence
and, in point of fact, has yet to sustain the defense in any of its proceed-
ngs.1 53 It has held that competition may be met to retain a customer, but
149. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
150. Atalanta was concerned with the lawfulness of promotional allowances challenged
under § 2(d) of the Act. Section 2(d)- unlike § 2(a), which is concerned with price
discrimination-does not expressly require that the products be of "like grade and quality"
before disproportionate allowances can be condemned. But the Second Circuit in Atalanta
read the requirement of "like grade and quality" into § 2(d). Id. at 369. Accord, Shulton,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 11 29783, at 37923 (Sept. 25, 1961).
151. 258 F.2d at 368.
152. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,249 (1951).
153. However, some investigations apparently have been dropped because of the de-
fense. Hearings on S. 11 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1959).
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not to gain a new one ;154 that a seller may not lower his price to enable his
customers to meet their own competition; 155 and that the defense is wholly
unavailable in section 2(d) cases. 156 Capping these limitations is the argu-
ment of the Commission staff that the price met must be a lawful one, with
the burden on the seller to prove its legality. 1 7 If the only way to meet com-
petition is to indulge in brinksmanship, "a seller constrained by law to reduce
prices to some only at the cost of reducing prices to all may well end by
reducing them to none."' 58 It is pertinent to ask how the public interest is
promoted by cutting the heart out of a defense which derives its content from
the paramount national policy of stimulating competition.
Despite the fact that Congress intended to permit the seller's cost savings
to be passed on to his customer,'5 9 the statutory cost justification defense also
has been virtually annulled by the Commission. As the Supreme Court noted
in Automatic Canteen,160 "whenever costs have been in issue, the Commis-
sion has not been content with accounting estimates; a study seems to be
required, involving perhaps stop-watch studies of time spent by some person-
nel such as salesmen and truck drivers, numerical counts of invoices or bills
and in some instances of the number of items or entries on such records, or
other such quantitative measurement of the operation of a business." The
upshot has been that the defense has "proved largely illusory in practice."' 161
The Advisory Committee on Cost Justification, which the Commission itself
established, promulgated its enlightening report in 1956, but the Commission
has never adopted it. In the rare case when a cost justification defense has
154. Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959). Contra, Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., No. 7708, FTC, pp. 3-4 (Feb. 20,
1961) (initial decision).
155. Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 977 (1959). The erroneous reading of the statute by
the Commission was reversed by the Fifth Circuit, Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas.
f[ 70083 (5th Cir. 1961), the court holding that the "defense of meeting competition in good
faith is available to a supplier of gasoline when the supplier reduces the wholesale price
of its gasoline to one of its filling stations engaged in a price battle at the consumer level
with a station owned and operated by a competing supplier." 1961 Trade Cas. ff 70083, at
78338.
156. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. f 29195 (Oct. 31, 1960) ; Shulton,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 29783 (July 25, 1961). Contra, Delmar Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. f" 69947 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
157. See E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978, 996, 1010 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). Contra, Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d
54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956). But cf. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 35-36, FTC v. Standard Oil Co.,
355 U.S. 396 (1958) ; FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 399 n.4 (1958).
158. AT"v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 181 (1955).
159. "Time and again there was recognition in Congress of a freedom to adopt and pass
on to buyers the benefits of more economical processes ... " Automatic Canteen Co. v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72 n.l1 (1953).
160. Id. at 68.
161. Ar'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 171 (1955).
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been sustained, the bar has been left without guidance as to the acceptable
accounting methodology. 62 As a result, pressure to avoid the perils of Rob-
inson-Patman attack leads again to a one-price policy. Cost savings are
pocketed by the seller, while the buyer and his customers, contrary to the
explicit intent of Congress, are denied "the benefits of more economical
processes."'
1 63
The Commission, not content with its virtually automatic inference of in-
jury to competition under section 2(a), coupled with the difficulty of estab-
lishing the statute's meeting-competition or cost-justification defenses, prefers,
whenever possible, to avoid section 2(a) in favor of section 2(c), the broker-
age provision. It is easy to understand why section 2(c) is in vogue. That
section is a per se statute with a vengeance: there is no requirement of proof
of any likelihood of injury, and there are no defenses.
The purpose of section 2(c) was to prevent evasion of section 2(a) through
the fictitious payment of brokerage to the buyer or the buyer's agents. But
the Commission has been pressing for an ever-widening sweep for the broker-
age provision. In the Broch case, 1 4 the Supreme Court sustained the Com-
mission's finding of violation where a seller passed on savings resulting when
his broker, not the buyer's, accepted a smaller commission so that the sale
might be consummated. And in the recent Thomasville Chair case, 16r respond-
ent sold furniture to large buyers at prices 5 per cent lower than to smaller
buyers, paying salesmen in its own employ a 3 per cent lower commission on
sales to the larger accounts. Although the salesmen admittedly were not
"brokers," the Commission held that the statute applied because they were
paid "a commission, brokerage, or other compensation" and the lower price
accorded the favored customers was based, in part, on the lower commission
to the salesmen.' 66 This strained interpretation of section 2(c) portends still
another onslaught against competitive pricing. If a seller saves by paying a
salesman who handles volume accounts a lower rate of commission than a
drummer who beats the pavements making small sales, why should the volume
buyer not reap the benefits of the seller's lower cost of doing business with
him? It is absurd to suggest that Congress intended to encourage the seller
to charge lower prices by allowing, under section 2(a), savings in selling
expenses to be passed on, while at the same time penalizing him under section
162. Hamburg Brothers, 54 F.T.C. 1450 (1958).
163. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,72 n.11 (1953).
164. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
165. Thomasville Chair Co., TRADE REG. REP. 11 29510 (Mar. 15, 1961).
166. In Thomasville Chair, the Commission found that respondent could not cost
justify the full 5% discount to larger buyers without including the lower sales commission,
and, further, that it had not, in fact, adhered to its purported categories and had allowed
some smaller buyers to purchase at prices 5% lower than they were entitled to under
respondent's pricing scheme. Nevertheless, the principle expounded by the Commission has a
generality of application which makes it significant.
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2(c) for doing that very thing. Yet these are the topsy-turvy implications of
Thomasville Chair.
It is indeed extraordinary that in the face of virtually unanimous denun-
ciation of section 2(c) by scholars of antitrust, 67 the Commission not only
accords it top billing in the enforcement scheme, 168 but seeks to enlarge its
scope beyond anything ever contemplated by Congress.
What then is to be the evaluation of a quarter-century of Robinson-Patman
jurisprudence?
The predilection for per se rules of invalidity has rigidified price structures,
deprived the economy of the advantages of free bargaining, prevented inno-
vation in marketing techniques, and moved us in the direction of a cartelized
distribution system.', 9 Instead of bolstering the Sherman Act, Robinson-Pat-
man has, in fact, suppressed competition in the guise of regulating it. This
need not have occurred. A price discrimination law properly designed and
administered could invigorate competition and promote the public welfare.
There is still validity to the old-fashioned view that competition is a summum
bonum, not only among sellers, but also among buyers, and that a retailer
who buys with skill, operates with efficiency, and passes on his savings to the
consumer, is "an ease to the people.'
170
What is needed is not the repeal of price discrimination laws but revived
faith in the beneficence of competition. Robinson-Patman is not an end in
itself; it is but one of the means of attaining larger antitrust goals.' 71 To
167. The Attorney General's Report called for legislation to restore to § 2(c) the
original vigor of the exception "for services rendered," stating that, "In our opinion, the
virtual legal monopoly conferred by Section 2(c) on one type of middleman clogs competi-
tion in the channels of distribution, and exacts tribute from the consumer for the benefit of
a special business class." ATT'v GEN. NAT'L Comm!. ANTITRUST REP. 191 (1955). Professor
Corwin Edwards, former chief economist of the Commission, concludes in his monumental
text that "the brokerage provision has no proper place in the statute." EDWARDS, THE PRICE
DIscuIwrnATxoN LAW 645 (1959). Dean Levi of the University of Chicago Law School has
branded § 2(c) an "ugly example of class legislation." Levi, The Robinson-Patnman Act-
Is It in the Public Interest? 1 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 60, 69 (1952). Frederick
Ml. Rowe asserts that: "If anything is clear in the annals of Robinson-Patman enforcement,
it is that Section 2(c) has served as a featherbedding guarantee for the organized food
brokers protected from competing forms of distribution at the ultimate expense of the con-
sumer." Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplishment utnder the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936-
1960: A Statement of the Issues, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION REp. 298, 304 (1960).
168. See EDWARDS, THE PRICE DIScRImINATION LAW 70 (1959), showing that 43.5%
of the Robinson-Patman complaints filed by the Commission from 1936 to 1957 attacked a
brokerage payment or receipt under § 2(c). That there has been no marked change in this
pattern may be seen from FTC ANNUAL REPORT 47 (1960).
169. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. f1 70083, at 78347 (5th Cir. 1961);
Douglas, J., dissenting in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949).
170. The Schoolmaster Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21, (Court of Common Pleas,
Hillary Term 1410).
171. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953); Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951); Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. f[ 70083, at 78344
(5th Cir. 1961); AT-'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST RE'. 132 (1955).
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correct the aberrations from basic antitrust philosophy may require some
amendments. But more important, it will require a new approach by the Com-
mission-greater concentration upon the hard core offenses which imperil
competition, abandonment of mechanical per se rules of liability which sub-
vert the statutory purpose, less attention to section 2(c), increased emphasis
upon section 2(f), and, finally, full utilization of its expertise to differentiate
between practices which undermine and those which advance the cause of
competition.
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